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Coverage Litigation: Has Help Arrived from the American
Law Institute Complex Litigation Project?
Peter J. Kalis"
James R. Segerdahl"
John T. Waldron, 1Wr
Choice of law-an enduring legal challenge-evolves into high drama when
the choice of legal rules is effectively case dispositive. Standard contract
language is construed contemporaneously in different jurisdictions and provides
a useful prism through which to view choice-of-law analysis. Because parties
can predict outcome based on choice of law, they creatively argue choice-of-law
issues and thus teach us about the potentialities and limits of each mode of
choice-of-law analysis.
"Standardized" contracts typically are intended by the drafter not only to
define clearly the rights of the parties, but also to promote the related goals of
efficiency, predictability, and uniformity, and, in an ideal world, the avoidance
of litigation. The extent to which a standard form achieves these goals depends
on numerous factors, including, for example, whether the form comprehensively
addresses possible areas of dispute. If a key point affecting the rights of the
parties is not addressed or is addressed ambiguously, then the form contract may
produce confusion and uncertainty-fertile conditions for unwelcome litigation.
The standard-form, pre-printed, comprehensive general liability policy
("CGL policy") used by the U.S. insurance industry over the past half century
is perhaps the most well-known and widely used standard form contract.' The
Copyright 1994. by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw.
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of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart or its clients.
1. A standardized CGL form was first available for use on an industry-wide basis in 1940.
7A John A. Appleman. Insurance Law & Practice § 4491 (Walter F. Berdal ed., 1979). In addition
to the goals noted above, standardization in the insurance context affords additional potential benefits,
including, for example, the reduction of transaction costs by eliminating the need for policy by policy
negotiation of policy language and pricing, the creation of the opportunity for universal risk
assessment by pooling loss information, the promotion of consistency within large, multi-layered
insurance programs, the creation of easily identifiable and commonly understood risks for reinsurance
purposes, and the creation of the opportunity for meaningful state regulation (without standardized
wording, regulators would be forced to assess the adequacy of insurer reserves by reviewing
individual policies). See Thomas M. Reiter et al.. The Pollution Evclusion Under Ohio Law: Staying
the Course, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1165, 1178 n.55 (1991). Thus, historically key CGL policy
provisions have not been subject to negotiation but are included in all CGL policies regardless of the
size and potential negotiating leverage of an individual policyholder. See, e.g., CPS Chem. Co. v.
Continental Ins. Co.. 536 A.2d 311. 318 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1988) (noting the uniformity of
standardized policy wording and holding that the rule of contra proferentum-that ambiguities in
policy language be construed against the insurer as drafter of the policy language-is "no less
applicable merely because the insured is itself a corporate giant. The critical fact remains that the
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CGL form was drafted and periodically revised by the insurance industry through
drafting committees of national rating bureaus and insurer service organizations
such as the Insurance Services Office ("ISO") and its predecessors.
The standardization of CGL policy language certainly has not eliminated
coverage litigation, nor could it ever have been reasonably expected to do so.
Many coverage disputes involve disagreements over how standard policy
language should be applied to particular factual situations. Since variations on
factual scenarios probably will never be exhausted, the standardization of policy
language could not eliminate this aspect of coverage litigation, no matter how
comprehensively the form addressed potential areas of dispute.
The frequency of another aspect of coverage litigation, however, could
conceivably be affected by a comprehensive and unambiguous standard-form
policy. Some coverage litigation concerns fundamental disagreement over the
manner in which the standard policy language is to be interpreted
generally-without regard necessarily to a particular fact pattern. For example,
the dispute between policyholders and insurers concerning coverage for
environmental property damage under historical CGL policy forms involves
threshold interpretive disputes. For a variety of reasons, most insurers contend
that the CGL policy form does not cover claims for environmental cleanup
costs? One might reasonably expect that once such interpretive disputes4 were
resolved in the courts, it would not be necessary to litigate the same issues over
and over again.
Unfortunately, court decisions apparently resolving the disputed interpretive
issues in the environmental coverage context have not eliminated or appreciably
reduced environmental coverage litigation. Under our federal system of
governance, questions of insurance policy construction are decided under state
law, and, predictably, the manner in which states address the same interpretive
ambiguity was caused by language selected by the insurer."); see also New Castle County v. Harlford
Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1189 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 1267 (1992) (also
discussing the lack of deviation from standard-form policy language even in policies covering large
insureds).
2. The development of the standardized CGL policy language has been described in numerous
judicial decisions and commentaries. See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a.ffd as modified, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984); Morton
Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993); Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd.,
456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990); Reiter et al., supra note I. at 1186-1200 (collecting commentaries and
cases).
3. See infra notes 21-24 (describing threshold interpretive disputes in environmental coverage
context).
4. Insurance companies have attempted to minimize such "interpretive" disputes in a variety
of ways, including, for example, by expressly defining certain key terms used in the insuring
agreement and exclusions. For example, the term "property damage" is a defined policy term. The
courts also have employed certain fundamental rules for dealing with interpretive disputes. For
instance, the rule of contra proferentmin, which applies in every United States jurisdiction, provides
that ambiguous policy language is construed against the drafter of the policy, i.e., the insurer. See,
e.g.. 2 Couch on Insurance 2d § 15:84 (rev. ed. 1984).
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issue can vary widely from state to state.5 Certainty and predictability cannot
be achieved with respect to interpretive issues by looking to decisional law
unless the question is answered, which state's decisional law controls? No
express direction on this point is available by reference to the standard CGL
policy form. 6 The drafters' failure to include a choice-of-law provision is a key
omission in the form resulting in contractual silence on an issue that dramatically
affects the rights of the parties to the contract. Moreover, the omission renders
virtually unattainable the goals of efficiency, predictability, and uniformity
inherent in the use of standardized forms.
The consequences of this omission have been felt most acutely in the context
of environmental insurance coverage litigation involving large policyholders with
a nationwide presence and underlying liabilities arising in more than one state.
5. Compare Just, 456 N.W.2d 570 (holding that the standard-form qualified pollution
exclusion does not bar coverage if pollution damage was unexpected or unintended by the
policyholder) with Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991) (holding
that the same standard provision bars coverage for all pollution damage that occurred gradually, even
if the damage was unexpected and unintended).
6. Some standardized general liability policy forms developed outside of the United
States-for example, by Underwriters at Lloyds of London and Certain London Market
Companies-do contain provisions relating to the applicable law. For example, standard London
Market policies include a provision entitled the "Service of Suit" clause which provides:
It is agreed that in the event of the failure of Underwriters herein to pay any amount
claimed to be due hereunder, Underwriters hereon, at the request of the Assured, will
submit to the jurisdiction of any Court of competent jurisdiction within the United States
and will comply with all requirements necessary to give such Court jurisdiction and all
matters arising hereunder shall be detennined in accordance with the law and practice
of such Court.
(emphasis added). Some courts have found that this is a choice-of-law provision dictating that the
insurer agrees to be bound by the law of the forum chosen by the insured. Capital Bank & Trust Co.
v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 576 F. Supp. 1522, 1525 (M.D. La. 1984); M.). Fishing Corp. v. John
Plumer & Partners Ltd., No. 85-127-S(M) (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990) (transcript of decision), vacated
due to settlement; Lexington Ins. Co. v. Union Am. Ins. Co., No. .85 Civ. 9181. slip op. (S.D.N.Y.
May 28, 1987); GAF Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, No. C 620 997. slip op. (Cal. Super.
Ct. Oct. II. 1989). This view would appear to be consistent with the intent of the drafters of the
clause. See, e.g., Letter from Duncan & Mount (counsel for Underwriters of Lloyds, London) (May
8, 1944) (introducing and quoting the above provision and characterizing it as a choice-of-law
provision by stating that the old version "has been amended to provide specifically for the application
of American law").
Other courts have held that the "Service of Suit" clause merely affords the policyholder the right
to select the forum and is not a substantive choice-of-law provision. Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v.
American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551 (D. Del. 1989); Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co., No. 88C-JA-1 18, sli op. (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 1990); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 555 N.E.2d 214 (Mass. 1990). These courts held that the "law and practice"
portion of the clause was a consent to the application of the forum's procedures (including choice-of-
law practice) but not a substantive provision. This interpretation is tmpersuasive. A construction of
the language as excluding the application of the substantive law of the forum would render that
language surplusage since the court always will apply its own procedural law and choice-of-law
principles to all actions before it. Moreover, the provision plainly states that "all matters" arising
under the contract will be governed by the forum court's law.
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As described below, the choice-of-law issue is of crucial, potentially dispositive,
importance in these cases. The far-flung features of so-called "comprehensive"
coverage cases' and the important public policy considerations these cases
involve--derived both from the concerned states' interest in the underlying
environmental liabilities and in the contractual issues-make this genre of
litigation particularly complex and the choice-of-law questions especially
difficult.
Neither the traditional choice-of-law rules& nor the still emerging modem
approaches to conflict questions 9 appear to provide a wholly satisfactory
analytical framework for addressing the conflict issues in the environmental
coverage context.' 0  The American Law Institute, in its recent Complex
7. A description of "comprehensive" environmental coverage litigation generally is set forth
infra at text accompanying notes II to 31.
8. The traditional manner of addressing conflict-of-law issues in contract cases involved a
straightforward application of the lex loci contractus rule, i.e., the law of the state in which the
contract at issue was made governs. Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 311 (1934) [hereinafter the
First Restatement]. More specifically, the First Restatement provided that the interpretation of
contracts is to be accomplished pursuant to the law of the state in which the contract was made while
issues concerning the performance of the contract were to be governed by the law of the state in
which performance was to occur. Id. §§ 311. 332. 358.
The traditional analogue to this rule in tort cases was lex loci delectus, providing that the law of
the state in which the underlying tort occurred should control. Id. § 378. In the event that conduct
in one state resulted in injury in another state, the First Restatement provided that the place of the
wrong should be considered the place where the last event necessary to make the actor liable
occurred. Id. § 377.
9. Over the years, numerous alternatives to the traditional lex loci contractus and lex loci
delectvs rules have emerged. Most prominently, the American Law Institute adopted the "most
significant relationship test" in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) Ihereinafter
Second Restatement]. This test requires that a court apply the law of the state with the most
significant relationship to the parties and issues, taking into consideration various principles such as
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interest of those states in the determination
of the particular issue; (d) the protection of justified expectations (e) the basic policies underlying
the particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and, (g) ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied. Id. § 6. These general principles are to be
considered in light of more specific factors depending on the appropriate context. Id. §§ 188, 193
(concerning insurance contracts), § 145 (concerning torts generally). For examples of the purported
application of the most significant relationship test in the insurance context. see Calvert Fire Ins. Co.
v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co.. 526 F. Supp. 623 (D. Neb. 1980); Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania
Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co.. 629 A.2d 885 (N.J. 1993).
Some jurisdictions, including California and New York, have adopted a so-called "governmental
interest" approach to choice-of-law issues. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.. 583
P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (N.Y. 1985). Under
this approach, the court first must determine on an issue-by-issue basis whether there is a conflict
between the potentially applicable state laws. If so, the court must determine whether each state has
a real interest in having its law applied. Finally, if such a tnte conflict exists, the coun should apply
the law of the state whose interests would be more impaired if its law were not applied.
10. Rigid application of the lex loci rules can be unsatisfactory in the environmental coverage
context for all of the same reasons they are sometimes considered unsatisfactory in other contexts.
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Litigation Project ("the Project"), proposes some approaches to choice-of-law
problems in complex litigation generally, all of which are designed to enhance
efficiency, predictability, and certainty, and some of which may be transferable
to complex environmental coverage litigation.
This article will describe the unique features of comprehensive
environmental coverage actions and the treatment of the conflicts issue in this
area to date. Next, the article will survey the Project's choice-of-law proposals
and consider the potential applicability of the proposals to comprehensive
environmental coverage actions. Finally, this article will analyze the importance
to the choice-of-law question of the forum state's interest in complex
environmental coverage actions, and the impact on the issue of the insurers'
failure to include a choice-of-law provision in the standard form policy.
I. COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL COVERAGE LITIGATION GENERALLY
By the mid-1980s, many corporate policyholders, particularly in the
manufacturing community, were beginning to experience the financial implica-
tions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") and its state progeny." As enforced by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and applied by the courts, CERCLA
imposed liability for environmental cleanup costs on a strict," joint and
several, 3 and retroactive basis. 4 The number of affected sites" and the
See generally Johnson Matthey v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n, 593 A.2d 367 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1991) (detailing deficiencies of a mechanical application of lex loci rules); Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d
205 (N.H. 1966); Griffith v. United Air Lines. Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 800-06 (Pa. 1964). Indeed, the
complex and far-flung nature of these cases, which involve contracts made and torts occurring in
numerous different states, render the lex loci rules particularly unavailing. See, e.g., Diamond Int'l
Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1498, 1502 (1st Cir. 1983) (noting that "place of contracting"
is often related to no more than an "accident of corporate procedure or convenience" that should not
be a controlling choice-of-law factor in cases implicating numerous significant state interests).
Similarly, application of the most significant relationship and governmental interest tests to
comprehensive coverage litigation involving the tort- and contract-based interests of numerous states
in a manner that produces efficient, consistent, and predictable results would appear to be difficult,
if not impossible. See infra at notes 32, 34 (describing conflicting state interests, emphasized by
various courts applying the same rules).
II. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146. 1150 (1st
Cir. 1989), clarified, 901 F.2d 3 (1990); J.V. Peters & Co. v. Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency, 767 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1985).
13. See, e.g.. United States v. Monsanto Co.. 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied.
490 U.S. 1106, 109 S. Ct. 3156 (1989); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1312-13 (E.D. Mo.
1987).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 734-35
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Hooker Chem.
& Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 556 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
15. About 1,200 sites appear on the National Priorities List ("NPL"). the EPA's listing of the
nation's most contaminated sites. The EPA has projected 2,100 NPL sites by the year 2000 while
19941
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aggregate amount of these liabilities has increased steadily, and estimates for
industry's total cleanup bill have ranged from $150 billion to over $700
billion.'6  This cleanup bill, whatever it turns out to be, may ultimately
represent only a fraction of the cost to industry associated with the contaminated
sites. For example, third-party claims alleging bodily injury or property damage
arising out of the contamination could add substantially to the final tab.'"
Because of the strict liability nature of CERCLA, many of these liabilities are
imposed without regard to fault and are based on waste disposal activities that
met or exceeded laws and regulations in effect when they occurred.
Historically, the manufacturing community absorbed the risk of claims
alleging bodily injury and property damage through the insurance mechanism,
primarily the standard-form CGL policy. The CGL policy was drafted and
marketed by the insurance industry as a wholesale externalization of risk of third-
party claims alleging bodily injury and property damage.' Rather than
covering only specific named perils or casualties, the CGL policy was designed
to cover the policyholder with respect to all forms of accidental bodily injury or
property damage, unless specifically and expressly excluded by the policy.'9
Prior to 1986, assuming an otherwise covered claim, the standard CGL
policy virtually always was "triggered"--obligated to respond-based on when
the underlying property damage or bodily injury occurred.20 Accordingly, since
the pollution damage triggering CERCLA liabilities often occurred on a
continuing basis starting decades ago, corporate policyholders naturally turned
to their historical CGL insurers for defense and indemnity coverage.
In some cases, insurers have agreed to cover their policyholders for
environmental liabilities imposed upon their insureds. Much more frequently,
however, insurers have refused to honor pollution claims on the grounds that
such claims simply are not covered on a threshold level. A variety of defenses
to coverage emerged, including, for example, arguments that cleanup costs are
not "damages" covered by the CGL policy; ' the EPA's initiation of an
Congress' Office of Technology estimated 10,000. Reiter et al., supra note 1, at 1170-71.
16. Id. at 1171 n.30.
17. Id.
18. See generall, Eugene R. Anderson et al., Enironmental hIsurance Coverage in New
Jersey: A Tale of Two Stories, 24 Rutgers L.J. 83, 106-08 nn. 114-124 (1992) (collecting various
insurer representations concerning the breadth of coverage afforded by CGL policies, particularly in
the pollution context).
19. Appleman, supra note I. §§ 4491.01, 4492.
20. Starting in 1986. so-called "claims-made" general liability policies were offered by the
insurance industry on a standard, ISO-produced form. These policies were "triggered" by reference
to when the "claim" against the policyholder was first made, rather than by when the underlying
injury occurred. Thus, generally speaking, a claims-made policy would respond only if a covered
"claim" was made against the insured during the policy period. The pre-1986 COL policy forms
responded if the alleged property damage or bodily injury occurred during the policy period, without
regard to when the "claim" was made.
21. The standard CGL policy obligates the insurer to indemnify its insured for amounts the
policyholder becomes legally obligated to pay "as damages" because of "bodily injury" or "property
[Vol. 54
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administrative proceeding under CERCLA is not a "suit" requiring a defense
under the CGL policy;22 a qualified "pollution exclusion" inserted in standard
CGL policies starting in 1970 bars coverage for virtually all pollution damage
that did not occur in an abrupt accident, i.e., an explosion or the like;23 and
damage" caused by a covered "occurrence." Many insurers have adopted the argument that
government-mandated cleanup costs are not "damages" because such costs are incurred by the
policyholder in response to claims for "equitable," as opposed to "legal," relief. According to these
insurers, the term "damages" is a limitation of coverage that provides that the insurer is obligated to
respond only if the claim against the policyholder is for money damages and is not akin to a request
for injunctive relief. The vast majority of state supreme courts that have addressed this issue has
rejected the insurer position. See AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (FMC Corp.), 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal.
1990); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.. 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1214-16 (111. 1992); A.Y.
McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.. 475 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1991); Bausch & Lomb
Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1021 (Md. App. 1993); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576, 583 (Mass. 1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 179-84 (Minn..1990); Coakley v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 618
A.2d 777, 782-85 (N.H. 1992); Morton Int'l Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831
(N.J. 1993); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 388 S.E.2d 557, 568-69
(N.C. 1990); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 515-16 (Wash. 1990);
Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co., 748 P.2d 724, 729-30 (Wyo. 1988). The one contrary
state court of last resort is the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. See Lido Co. of New England v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 574 A.2d 299 (Me. 1990); Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573
A.2d 16 (Me. 1990).
22. The standard CGL policy form obligates the insurer to defend the policyholder against
"suits" alleging liability within the coverage of the policy. The courts have long held that the duty
to defend is activated if the underlying suit alleges any facts that may potentially bring the claim
within the coverage of the policy. Ohio Casutiy Ins. Co. v. Flanagin. 210 A.2d 221 (N.J. 1965);
Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 289 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972); Employers'
Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397, 402 (R.I. 1968). Under CERCLA and related state statutory
schemes, the government's claim and the administrative record typically begin not with a formal
complaint filed in a court of law, but with a "potentially responsible party" letter ("prp letter") or
similar administrative action. Although policyholders facing environmental liabilities typically must
commence their defense upon receipt of such a prp letter, many insurers argue that such claims are
not "suits," and therefore there is no duty to defend such a claim under the CGL policy. Most courts
have rejected the insurer position. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp.. 948 F.2d
1507 (9th Cir. 1991); Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d 1204; A. Y. McDonald Indus., 475 N.W.2d 607:
Hazen Paper, 555 N.E.2d 576; C.D. Spangler Constr., 388 S.E.2d 557. But see Ray Indus., Inc. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1992); Becker Metals Corp. v. Transportation Ins. Co.,
802 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
23. From 1970 through 1985. the standard form CGL policy included a qualified pollution
exclusion that provided:
This insurance does not apply to:
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gasses, waste
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon the land, the
atmosphere or any water course or body of water, but this exclusion does not apply if
such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
Insurers contend that this provision precludes all coverage for claims arising out of pollution damage
unless the discharge of pollutants was unexpected and temporally abrupt. Policyholders, relying on,
hiter alia, (I) the rule that ambiguous policy language must be construed in favor of the insured, (2)
1994]
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continual pollution damage should be deemed to have occurred only when the
property damage becomes "manifest," typically after a so-called absolute
pollution exclusion began appearing in the standard CGL policy form in 1986.24
Accompanying these threshold legal disputes are defenses based on the particular
facts of the case, including, for example, the intentionality of the property
damage.23
The result of these disputes has been an explosion of insurance coverage
litigation. The response of the courts to the insurers' defenses to environmental
coverage claims has been mixed. Some jurisdictions have emerged as hospitable
forums for policyholders seeking to enforce their policies; other jurisdictions
favor the insurers' positions. More typically, the individual jurisdictions have not
lined up uniformly on one side or the other, but have reached pro-policyholder
results on some key issues and pro-insurer results on others.
case law existing prior to 1970 interpreting the term "sudden" to mean essentially "unexpected" in
the insurance context, (3) dictionary definitions defining the term "sudden" as simply "unexpected,"
(4) the documented drafting history of the provision, and (5) the insurance industry's 1970
representations to state insurance commissioners that the provision only clarifies that intentional
pollution is not covered, argue that the qualified pollution exclusion has no applicability to
unintentional pollution damage. The case law addressing the issue is split. Compare Morton hit'l,
629 A.2d 831; Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570 (Wis. 1990); Joy Technologies, Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1992); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380
S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989); Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (adopting policyholder position), with
Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991); Waste Management of
Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986) (adopting insurer position).
24. The standard CGL policies in effect prior to 1986 responded only if covered property
damage or bodily injury resulted "during the policy period." In cases involving pollution damage
that occurred over several years and spanning multiple policy periods, the question arises as to when
the property damage happened. Some insurers take the position that property damage happens in this
context only when it is "discovered" or becomes "manifest." Others argue that property damage
results when the insured property was directly exposed to the alleged pollutant or, in the case of a
landfill, when the policyholder sent waste to the landfill. Not surprisingly, the insurer positions
typically are designed to limit the coverage responsibilities to as few policies as possible.
Policyholders typically argue that in the case of continuing, gradual property damage, all policies on
the risk from the date of initial exposure to discovery of the damage are triggered. The courts have
not addressed the issue in a uniform way. Cotmipare New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co.,
725 F. Supp. 800. 809-13 (D. Del. 1989) (adopting a pro-policyholder position) with Mraz v.
Canadian Univ. Ins. Co.. 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986) (adopting a form of discovery trigger).
25. Over the years, the standard-form CGL policy has provided that it covers only injuries that
were unexpected and unintended by the insured. In the environmental coverage context, insurers
often argue that the pollution damage at issue was caused intentionally and thus is not covered either
under the terms of the policy or for public policy reasons. This fundamental fact issue is
accompanied by a number of related legal issues, including for example, whether the policyholder's
intent should be measured by an objective or subjective standard, which party bears the burden of
proof, and whether the intent of lower-level employees may be imputed to the corporate policyholder.
See 8eterally City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989). Morton
It'. 629 A.2d 831; Shell Oil Co. v. Winterhur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8.15, 840-42 (Cal.
App. Ist Dist. 1993).
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The patchwork of state law that has evolved over the past decade or so has
raised dramatically the profile of the choice-of-law issue in environmental
coverage disputes. The resolution of this issue can be dispositive of whether a
claim is covered, or, at a minimum, can substantially affect the value of the
claim.
In relatively localized environmental coverage actions, the choice-of-law
issue can be straightforward. For example, there is no difficult choice-of-law
issue when the case involves a policyholder located in one state with a single.
environmental liability arising in the same state, and the policyholder is seeking
coverage in that state's court under a single insurance policy clearly "made" in
the policyholder's state and issued by an insurer based across town through the
local insurance agency. This is rarely the case, however, in complex, compre-
hensive environmental coverage cases.
2 6
Large corporate policyholders often have numerous environmental liabilities
arising out of distinct operations located in many different states across the
country. These multi-national policyholders may have had dozens of plant
locations across the country that are now subject to cleanup activity. Moreover,
these plants may have shipped waste to dozens of landfills across the country
that are now themselves the subject of CERCLA attention. Such large
policyholders typically insured themselves over the years with layers of CGL
protection, often involving a primary, or initial layer of insurance issued by one
insurer, and up to a dozen additional layers of insurance providing excess
coverage through numerous different insurers in each layer. The insurer-
participants in each layer and the brokers involved in placing the policies
typically change many times over the years. It is not unusual for a comprehen-
sive coverage action to involve well over one hundred different insurance
entities.
7
A common thread typically intertwining the entire insurance program is the
standard-form CGL policy issued by each of the defendant-insurers and their
collective position that this form does not apply to environmental property
26. See generally Peter J. Kalis &Thomas M. Reiter, Forwn Non Conveniens: A Case
Management Tool for Comprehensive Environmental Insurance Coverage Actions?, 92 W. Va. L.
Rev. 391, 394-402 (1990) (describing various complex comprehensive environmental insurance
coverage actions).
27. For example, as originally filed, the environmental coverage litigation brought by
Westinghouse Electric Corporation and related corporate entities involved over 140 insurer defendants
and over 80 sites located in 23 different states. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., No. 069351-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. filed May 7. 1987). Examples of other comprehensive
coverage actions include: FMC Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 643058 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed
Nov. 13, 1987); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 577 A.2d 305 (Del. Super. Ct.
1989); Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 559 A.2d 1301 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988); United
Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 87-7172 (Mass. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 24, 1987);
Waste Management Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co.. No. HUD-L-931-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 27,




damage claims.28 In view of this fundamental threshold dispute, which applies
at the initial interpretive level without regard to the particular facts and
circumstances at each site, many large policyholders have sought a declaration
of their rights under their insurance program with respect to the entire array of
environmental claims pending against them in a "comprehensive" environmental
coverage action. Some insurers have argued that separate lawsuits should be
initiated on a state-by-state basis with each case involving only coverage claims
for those sites located in the forum state and the coverage issues at each site
being resolved in accordance with the separate law of each forum state. 29 Most
courts correctly have rejected this fractionalized approach and its attendant
invitation to piecemeal litigation and inconsistent results, 30 and comprehensive
environmental coverage actions have become relatively common.3
II. EMERGING CHOICE OF LAW APPROACHES IN COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL COVERAGE ACTIONS
The choice-of-law challenges in comprehensive environmental coverage
actions are apparent. The courts that have struggled with the issue in the context
of comprehensive coverage actions have considered differing policy factors in
their analysis. For example, some courts have considered the overriding state
interest to be the interest in deciding financial responsibility for clean-up of
contaminated sites located in the state. 2  If applied to a comprehensive
28. For a description of certain of the interpretive-level defenses on which the insurers typically
rely, see supra notes 21-24.
29. Kalis & Reiter, supra note 26, at 398-99 (describing fractionalized approach to resolving
environmental insurance coverage disputes supported by certain insurers).
30. See, e.g.. United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 555 N.E.2d 224 (Mass.
1990); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 559 A.2d 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989). But see Union Carbide Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Stir. Co., 562 A.2d 15 (Conn. 1989)
(affirming a trial court's dismissal of comprehensive environmental coverage litigation in favor of
site-by-site approach but noting policyholders' acquiescence in the fractionalization). In
Weslinghouse, the court noted:
This kind of fractionalization is a most potent weapon in the arsenal of the litigant whose
primary and subversive aim is to impose both upon the judicial system and the adversary
by endlessly delaying the day upon which the entire controversy will finally come to an
end and the respective rights of the litigants resolved--clearly, consistently and finally.
It is only the single comprehensive action, designed to adjudicate the entire controversy
between litigants, which can protect both the court and the parties from that calculated
imposition.
559 A.2d at 439. See also Kalis & Reiter. supra note 26, at 398-99 (further describing flaws inherent
in fractionalized approach).
31. See supra note 27.
32. MAPCO Alaska Petroleum, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 941 (D. Alaska
1991); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-0968, 1991 WL
206765 (E.D. Pa. Oct. I, 1991); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252 (D.
Md. 1989); Chesapeake Utils. Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551 (D. Del.
1989); Jones Truck Lines v. Transport Ins. Co.. 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,169 (E.D. Pa.
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coverage action involving sites in more than one state, of course, the mechanical
application of a site-by-site approach could be inefficient.3 Other courts have
focused on the contract nature of the cases and have considered the location of
the underlying claims to be a less important factor.' When the contracts are
made in numerous states, as is often the case in comprehensive actions, this
approach may also be unworkable. The only certainty is that no consensus on
the issue has emerged, and the goals of efficiency, predictability, and uniformity
remain elusive.
The courts in New Jersey perhaps have had the most opportunity to develop
a coherent choice-of-law approach in the context of environmental coverage
actions. Even in New Jersey, however, the rules are far from certain, and their
application to comprehensive actions remains in doubt.
New Jersey's first statement on the issue came in the context of Westing-
house Electric Corporation's comprehensive coverage action. Westinghouse filed
a complaint seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that it had insurance
coverage under CGL policies for certain environmental and toxic tort liabilities,
including over eighty sites located in over twenty different states." The trial
court, concerned that the law of each state in which a site was located would
May 9, 1989).
33. Kalis & Reiter, supra note 26, at 398-99.
34. See. e.g., Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 743 F. Supp. 1044. 1048-49 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus.. Inc., 390 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1990). In Triangle
Industries, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that New Jersey law must be applied to an
environmental coverage action in which a New Jersey based policyholder sought coverage for
environmental liabilities arising out of a landfill located in Ohio. The waste at issue was generated
at the policyholder's facility in West Virginia. The court determined that the law of the place of
formation of the contract should govern, unless another state has a more significant relationship to
the transaction and the panics, or the law of the other state is contrary to the public policy of West
Virginia. 390 S.E.2d at 567. The court held that the law of New Jersey. where the contracts were
made, governed and that although the underlying liability arose elsewhere, no other state had a more
significant relationship to the transaction and panies. Id.
It is clear that West Virginia takes seriously the public policy exception to its basic choice-of-law
rule. In a subsequent environmental insurance coverage action, Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1992), the court refused to apply Pennsylvania law to the
interpretation of the qualified pollution exclusion issue because Pennsylvania law, which has adopted
the insurer position on the intermediate appellate court level, would offend West Virginia public
policy. The public policy basis of the court's decision was based on representations made by the
insurance industry to the West Virginia insurance commissioner when the insurers sought approval
of the provision without a reduction in premium rates in 1970. The court recounted the written
record compiled in 1970 by the commissioner and the insurance industry's representations that the
qualified pollution exclusion was intended merely to clarify existing coverage and that coverage was
continued for "accidental" pollution. Because the commissioner's approval of the provision was
expressly based on these representations, the supreme court held that it would violate public policy
for West Virginia courts to enforce the pollution exclusion pursuant to a foreign state's law that is
inconsistent with the insurers' "studied, unambiguous, official, affirmative representations to the state,
its subdivisions, or its regulatory bodies." Id. at 497.
35. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 547 A.2d 1167, 1168 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1988). rey'd. 559 A.2d 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
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have to be applied to coverage issues applicable to each site (the "law-of-the-site
approach") and that this task would prove unwieldy and unworkable, dismissed
all non-New Jersey sites and claimants on forum non conveniens grounds. 36 On
appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding
that the actions should proceed comprehensively.a7 In so doing, the court
expressly rejected the law-of-the-site approach, stating:
In our view, the notion that the insured's rights under a single policy
vary from state to state depending on the state in which the claim
invoking the coverage arose contradicts not only the reasonable
expectations of the parties but also the common understanding of the
commercial community. It also seems to us anomalous, in conflict-of-
law terms, to suggest that more than one body of law will apply to a
single contract. The theme running through the federal mega-coverage
cases is the assumption not only that state law will determine whose
insurance law will govern the coverage dispute but also that it will be
a single state's law, chosen in accordance with the applicable conflict
principles of the forum.38
The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division next addressed the
choice-of-law issue in an environmental insurance coverage action in Johnson
Maithey Inc. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Co. 9 In
Johnson Matthey, the plaintiff sought a declaration of coverage for its liability
arising out of its generation and deposit of hazardous waste at certain sites in
New Jersey. The trial court ruled that the law of Pennsylvania, the place of
contracting, applied.
The appellate division reversed. First, the appellate division stated that the
lex loci contractus test is inapplicable when another state has the "most
significant relationship" to the parties and the transaction at issue under the
principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws sections 6
and 188 [hereinafter "Second Restatement"]. Second, under the Second Restate-
ment section 193, dealing specifically with casualty insurance policies, the court
held that it would apply the law of the state that the parties understood to be the
principal location of the insured risk, unless, under the factors listed in Second
Restatement section 6, another state has a more significant relationship to the
parties and the transaction. Based on these rules, the court adopted a law-of-the-
site approach, holding that New Jersey law would be applied to interpret
insurance policies purchased to cover New Jersey risks.40 The court acknowl-
36. Id. at 1174.
37. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v, Liberty MuI. Ins. Co., 559 A.2d 435 (N.J. Super. Ci. App. Div.
1989).
'38. Id. at 442.
39. 593 A.2d 367 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div, 1991).
40. Id. at 373.
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edged that its decision was "not in harmony with Westinghouse," but stated that,
since, unlike Westinghouse, the insured risks in the case were all located in one
state, the two cases were factually different.4 ' Nevertheless, the court noted that
application of the law-of-the-site approach to an action involving sites in more
than one state could result in the potential application of numerous state's law
in the same action to the same insurance contracts. 2
The appellate division again applied a law-of-the-site approach in Gilbert
Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Association Insurance Co.' 3
While the policyholder in Gilbert Spruance generated the hazardous waste at
issue in Pennsylvania, the sites at issue all were located in New Jersey. Hence,
as in Johnson Matthey, the environmental sites at issue in Gilbert Spruance were
all located in one state.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and affirmed the
appellate division's decision in Gilbert Spruance." In its opinion, the supreme
court appeared to reject the uniform-contract-interpretation approach in favor of
a law-of-the-site approach.4 Turning to the Second Restatement section 193
to determine choice of law in cases involving casualty insurance policies, such
as CGL policies, the court held that it should apply the law of the state that the
parties understood to be the principal location of the insured risk. The court
acknowledged that the importance of the location of the insured risk decreases
in cases in which the insured's activities are carried out in several different
states. In these cases, the court noted, the law of the state with the most
significant relationship to the case under the principles stated in Second
Restatement section 6 should be applied. 6 In this case, the court determined
that these factors pointed toward application of the law of New Jersey-where
the landfills were located-even though the waste was generated at the
policyholder's facilities in Pennsylvania. 7 Finally, the supreme court distin-
guished Westinghouse as a case that involved sites in several states compared to
the one site in one state at issue in Gilbert Spruance."
On the same day it decided Gilbert Spruance, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held in another case that it would violate New Jersey public policy to
41. Id. at 373-74.
42. Id. The court noted that the uniform interpretation of insurance contracts was not a
controlling consideration because it did not have "sufficient value to overcome the significant
governmental interest of the various jurisdictions where the insured risks are located, or where the
insured entity predictably is going to incur legal liabilities." Id. at 371. The court's holding ignores
the benefits of interpreting insurance policy language uniformly and, in so doing, partially eviscerates
many of the basic goals of a standardized policy. See supra notes 1, 30, 38.
43. 603 A.2d 61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992). affd, 629 A.2d 885 (N.J. 1993).
44. Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 885 (N.J. 1993).
45. Id. at 888-90.
46. Id. at 891.
47. Id. at 891-92.
48. Id. at 890.
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construe the qualified pollution exclusion4 9 inconsistently with the representa-
tions that the insurance industry made to the New Jersey state commissioners at
the time the provision was introduced.5s This holding will affect the choice-of-
law determination in cases in which a party seeks to apply the law of a state that
has construed the qualified pollution exclusion inconsistently with the insurance
industry's representations, i.e., inconsistently with New Jersey public policy as
expressed in Morton. 
5
As noted previously, the West Virginia Supreme Court has already held in
the Joy Technologies case that the public policy considerations described in
Morton require that West Virginia courts refuse to apply non-forum law to the
qualified pollution exclusion issue if the foreign law adopts the current insurer
position. 2 Similarly, in American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.," the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, refused
to apply Pennsylvania law" to the pollution exclusion issue arising out of a
49. See supra note 23.
50. Morton Int'l. Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993). In
Morton, the supreme court detailed the representations made to state insurance commissioners in
1970, when the qualified pollution exclusion was first proposed as a mandatory endorsement to
standard-form CGL policies. The court noted that the insurance industry represented that the
provision merely "clarified" existing coverage tnder the form and that pollution coverage remained
intact for "accidents." Based on these representations, the provision was approved by state regulators
without consideration of a standard premium adjustment. The supreme court held that it would
violate New Jersey public policy to now allow the same insurance industry to argue that the qualified
pollution exclusion (approved by regulators on the basis of the representations noted above) is
actually a sweeping bar of all coverage for pollution damage that does not occur instantaneously.
51. It is well settled in New Jersey and elsewhere that a court must not apply foreign law if
to do so would violate the public policy of the forum state. See, e.g., National Starch & Chem. Corp.
v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 318 (D.N.J. 1990) (declining to apply foreign law to a multistate
environmental coverage action with significant New Jersey contacts in part because foreign law may
frustrate New Jersey public policy); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Simmons' Estate, 417 A.2d
488, 495-96 (N.J. 1980) (recognizing principle that fundamentally inconsistent public policy of the
forum slate and other interested states would require application of forum law); Bell v. Merchants
& Businessmen's Mut. Ins. Co., 575 A.2d 878, 880 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (warning against
"mechanical application" of a choice-of-law nile that would lead to a result "inconsistent with the
fundamental policies and interest of the forum state"). cert. denied. 585 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1990); Turner
v. Aldens, Inc.. 433 A.2d 439. 443 (N.J. Super, Ct. App. Div. 1981) (noting and employing forum
court's authority to disregard contractual choice of law if the chosen law would violate the forum's
public policy); Freedom Fin. Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co.. 302 A.2d 184, 188 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1973) (holding that "clearly" a state is not "required to enforce a contract ... repugnant
to its public policy"); Oxford Consumer Discount Co. v. Stefanelli, 246 A.2d 460, 473-74 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (rejecting an argument that the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution requires a fornm slate "to enforce a contract valid under non-forum law where
enforcement would subvert the public policy of the forum state" and refusing to do so), aft'd, 262
A.2d 874 (N.J. 1970).
52. See supra note 34.
53. No. W-56581-88, slip op. at 23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 19, 1993) (transcript of
order denying summary judgment motion).
54. Pennsylvania law at the intermediate appellate level favors the insurers on the qualified
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• Pennsylvania site because of the public policy announced by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Morton.
Accordingly, the choice-of-law issue in New Jersey does not appear to be
wholly settled with respect to comprehensive environmental coverage actions.
The New Jersey appellate courts have recognized the varied state interests
implicated by such actions, but have not yet directly applied them to comprehen-
sive environmental coverage actions involving sites in multiple states.
III. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROJECT
As demonstrated above, no consensus has emerged among the nation's
courts concerning the resolution of the choice-of-law issue in comprehensive
environmental insurance coverage actions. The Project's choice-of-law proposals
are intended to be applicable to complex litigation generally and specifically
reference comprehensive coverage litigation as an example of such litigation."
Specifically, the ALl has proposed a federal code to govern the choice of law in
complex cases that are consolidated in federal court. The potential applicability
of the Project to comprehensive environmental insurance coverage actions is
considered below. First, however, it is necessary to overview the basics of the
ALl proposal.
The Project consists mainly of two separate guidelines for the determination
of choice of law--one approach for handling "mass tort" cases and the second
for "mass contract" cases. 6 The stated goal of the Project is to provide a
procedural solution to the choice-of-law determination that fosters the fair, just,
and efficient resolution of complex cases." The Proposed Final Draft explicitly
adopts "the objective of applying ... a single state's law to all similar ...
claims being asserted against a defendant."3" As such, the proposals are
pollution exclusion. See Lower Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 557 A.2d
393 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), appeal denied, 567 A.2d 653 (Pa. 1989). Although the Pennsylvania
Superior Court has to date adopted the insurer's current litigation position, it has not yet considered
the public policy and regulatory estoppel issues addressed in Morton and Joy Technologies.
55. American Law Institute. Complex Litigation Project. Proposed Final Draft (May 13, 1993)
§ 6.03. Reporter's Note 4 to cmit. a, at 464 [hereinafter Proposed Final Draftl (citing several
comprehensive cases including Westinghourse).
56. Id. §§ 6.01-6.03. In the other sections of the Proposed Final Draft concerning choice of
law in complex litigation, the ALl proposes that. unless an exception applies, the court should choose
the law of the state chosen under the mass tort/mass contract guidelines for the law governing the
statute of limitations and the measure of monetary relief other than punitive damages. Id. §§ 6.04.
6.05. The ALI further proposes a guideline for the choice of law governing the applicability and
measure of punitive damages, id. § 6.06, a procedural guideline regarding the court's designation of
the governing law and appeal from that decision, id. § 6.07, and a guideline for the choice of law in
actions based on federal law when an intercircuit conflict exists. id. § 6.08.
57. Id. Ch. 6. Intro. Note, at 375.
58. See, e.g.. id. § 6.01(a); see also id. § 6.03(a). This statement of objective appears to be a
repudiation of the law-or-the-site approach whenever possible in the context of multistate
comprehensive environmental insurance coverage actions.
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intended to aid in the prioritization of state interests implicated by alleged
tortious conduct and contract disputes. Because comprehensive environmental
insurance coverage cases implicate state interests arising out of the alleged
underlying tons, as well as out of the insurance policies as contracts, the
proposed rules for both tort and contract cases may provide guidance and are
considered below.
A. Mass Tort Cases
Under the Proposed Final Draft's mass tort choice-of-law analysis, the court
must first determine which states have a policy that would be furthered by the
application of their law. 9 This determination is based on three factors: "()
the place or places of injury; (2) the place or places of the conduct causing the
injury; and (3) the primary places of business or habitual residences of the
plaintiffs and defendants."'  These three fact-specific factors must then be
evaluated in light of their importance to a given state's regulatory objectives or
policies.'
While the first two factors will be easily applied in many cases, the proposal
notes that a party's primary place of business should not necessarily be
considered the same as that party's state of incorporation or the state of the
party's corporate headquarters. Instead, it describes a party's primary place of
business as the place of business that is most directly linked with the events
involved in the litigation.62 Thus, under this approach, the primary place of
business of a party may vary depending on the nature of the litigation.
63
If, under the above analysis, only one state has a policy that would be
furthered by the application of its law, then that state's law governs. 6  In
complex mass tort cases, however, more than one state will often have a policy
that would be furthered by the application of its laws; hence, some mechanism
must exist for choosing among these competing states. 'To make this choice, the
ALl first proposes that "[i]f the place of injury and the place of the conduct
causing the injury are in the same state, that state's law governs. "65
The state where the injury and conduct occurred has several potentially
important interests at stake in the litigation. For instance, as the place where the
injury occurred, the state has interests in compensating persons harmed there and
in regulating all conduct that causes injury in the state.6 In addition, as the
59. Id. § 6.01(b).
60. Id. § 6.01(b)(I)-(3).
61. Id. § 6.01, cmt. a. at 398. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971)
(seeking to identify stales with a significant relalionship to ihe case).
62. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 55, § 6.01, cml. a. at 404.
63. 1d.
64. Id. § 6.01(c).
65. Id. § 6.01(c)(1).
66. Id. § 6.01, cmt. a, at 402.
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place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, the state has interests in
regulating the parties' conduct and in imposing liability on parties who engage
in tortious conduct.67 According to the ALI, these interests outweigh whatever
interest the states that are the primary place of business or habitual residences of
the parties may have, consequently, the law of the state where the injury and the
conduct causing that injury occurred should be applied.68
If no state is both the place of injury and the place of the conduct causing
that injury, then the ALl proposes that, if all of the plaintiffs and at least one
defendant habitually reside or have their primary places of business in the same
state, then the laws of that state should govern the plaintiffs' claims against that
defendant. 69 The rationale behind this rule, according to the ALI, is that it
enables the state to give effect to tort policies regarding the allocation of loss
among the parties.70 Moreover, the state in which both parties are located has
an important interest in regulating the relationships among its citizens."
Therefore, the law of this "common residence" state should be applied because
that state has the most significant relation to the litigation in question. 2
Similarly, if the above rules do not apply, and the place of injury is a state in
which all plaintiffs habitually reside or have their primary places of business, then
the law of that state governs the case.73 As in the above rule, the plaintiffs "shall
be considered as sharing a common habitual residence or primary place of business
if they are located in states whose laws are not in material conflict." 74 Hence, if
the plaintiffs are injured in Ohio and all of the plaintiffs reside either in Ohio or in
states with laws that do not materially conflict with Ohio's, then Ohio law will
govern because of the importance of that state's interests in both compensating
victims who reside in the state and regulating conduct that directly injures its
residents.75
Finally, if none of the above rules apply, the ALl proposes that the court
choose the law of the state where the conduct causing the injury occurred.76 This
state has an interest in regulating the defendant's conduct and potential tort
liability.7" While other states, identified under Section 6.01(b), would also have
interests in having their laws applied, "relying on the place of conduct appears fair
and consistent with the objectives of achieving the uniform and consistent treatment
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id. § 6.01(c)(2). Note that states whose laws are not in material conflict are considered to
be the same state for purposes of this section of the proposal. Id.
70. Id. § 6.01. cmi. a, at 403.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. § 6.01(c)(3).
74. Id.
75. See id. § 6.01. cmt. a. at 403.
76. Id. § 6.01(c)(4).
77. Id. § 6.01. cmt. a. at 405.
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of claimants harmed by the defendant's conduct."78 If the defendant's conduct
occurred in more than one state, the law of the state with the "most significant
relationship to the occurrence" will be chosen.79 In other words, it is left to the
court's discretion "to decide which conduct is most implicated in the events giving
rise to the litigation in order to designate the governing law."8W
Thus, the Project sets forth a fairly mechanical approach to the selection of the
governing state's law in mass tort cases. However, the ALl presents two further
provisions in an attempt to mollify any harsh results that may be produced under
this mechanical framework. First, the Proposed Final Draft states that, to avoid
unfair surprise or arbitrary results in the choice-of-law determination, either the
court may depart from the order of the rules described above, or it may consider the
policies of states that the court has previously determined do not have policies that
would be furthered by the application of their law." The ALl cautioned, however,
that this provision was intended to provide a "safety valve" from arbitrary results
and not an excuse to undermine the consistent application of the proposal's
rules. 2
Second, the ALI allows the court to decide that it is inappropriate to apply a
single state's law to all of the elements of the plaintiffs' claims against the
defendant; in this event, the court may divide the actions into subgroups and apply
different states' laws to the different subgroups. 83 Similarly, the court' can decide
that only certain claims should be governed by the law chosen under the ALl mass
tort framework, and that the other claims should be remanded back to the state
court that transferred the case to the federal court, where the actions will be
governed by the law chosen under that state's choice-of-law rules.64 According
to the ALl, these powers are necessary to ensure that the objectives of special state
policies are actually served by the application of the law chosen under the ALI
rules.85 Moreover, these powers give the court discretion to avoid the outcome of
the ALI's choice-of-law rules when the court determines that doing so is necessary
to promote fairness or encourage the consolidation of the litigation. 6
B. Mass Contract Cases
Unlike tort cases, parties to contracts can agree beforehand, as evidenced by
a provision in the contract, on what law will govern a dispute between the parties
on that contract. If the parties have included a choice-of-law provision in their
78. Id. § 6.01, cmi. a, at 405-06.
79. Id. § 6.01(c)(4).
80. Id. § 6.01, cmt. a, at 406.
81. Id. § 6.01(d).
82. Id. § 6.0!, cml. d. at 431.
83. Id. § 6.01(e).
84. Id.




contract, the Proposed Final Draft instructs the court to honor that provision,
unless (1) the provision is invalid because of misrepresentation, duress, undue
influence, or mistake; or (2) "the law chosen by the parties is in material conflict
with fundamental regulatory objectives of the state law" that would be chosen
under the ALl guidelines in the absence of any choice-of-law provision in the
contract." By generally honoring the contracting parties' choice, the Proposed
Final Draft is intended to promote predictability, facilitate the consolidated
treatment of mass contract cases, and conform to the reasonable expectations of
the parties.88
In the absence of a contractual choice of law by the parties, the Proposed
Final Draft first requires the court to identify the states that have a policy that
would be furthered by the application of their law.8 9 In making this determina-
tion, the court is to consider four factors: "(I) the place or places of contracting;
(2) the place or places of performance; (3) the location of the subject matter of
the contract; and (4) the primary places of business or habitual residences of the
plaintiffs and defendants."'
As under the mass tort framework, if only one state, as a result of that
state's relation to the transaction or the parties, has a policy that would be
furthered by the application of its laws, then that state's law should be chosen. 9'
However, in today's complex mass contract cases, more than one state will often
have a regulatory interest in the litigation. To resolve the choice of law conflict
between states with competing interests, the ALl chooses the law of the state in
which the "common contracting party" has its primary place of business.
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87. Id. § 6.02(a)(I)-(2). If the choice-of-law provision is not honored by the court, the choice-
of-law determination will be made under § 6.03 as if no provision were ever included in the contract.
Id. § 6.02 cmt. a. at 446.
88. Id. § 6.02. cmt. a, at 445.
89. Id. § 6.03(b).
90. Id. § 6.03(b)(I)-(4). While admitting that the places of contracting and performance could
be ambiguous depending on the circumstances, the ALI refuses to resolve the potential ambiguity,
instead leaving the resolution of this problem to the courts. Id. § 6.03, cmt. a, at 462. Note also that
the ALI's use here of the phrase "primary place of business" is identical to its use in the mass tort
context. See, e.g., id. at 461 ("As is true when that term is used in a mass tort choice of law dispute
.. the court is expected to identify the place of business that is most directly or closely linked with
the contracts at issue."); see also supra text accompanying note 4.
91. Id. § 6.03(c), cmt. a, at 460.
92. Id. § 6.03(c). An exception to this rule exists if the state law chosen "is in material conflict
with the regulatory objectives of the state law in the place of performance or where the other
contracting parties habitually reside." Id.
Note also that, as discussed in the mass tort context, "primary place of business" does not refer
simply to the common contracting party's corporate headquarters; on the contrary, the determination
of "primary place of business" requires the court to identify the place of the common contracting
party's business that is "most directly or closely linked with the contracts at issue." Id. § 6.03, cmt.
a, at 461. Therefore, the party's primary place of business will vary depending on the contracts in
dispute and the activities associated with them. Id.
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The ALI adopted this approach for two reasons. First, the state of the
common contracting party's primary place of business has substantial interests
in the litigation. By definition, the "primary place of business" is a state in
which the common contracting party has substantial business contacts; moreover,
the litigation may be directly related to that business activity. 93 Second, in
multistate contracts cases, the places of contracting and performance and the
habitual residences of the other contracting parties will ordinarily be situated in
several different states. Consequently, since the common contracting party's
primary place of business is arguably the only remaining factor that could
adequately identify the controlling state law, "the need to identify a single
governing law suggests that reference to the law at the primary place of business
is justified."" Thus, the ALl approach attempts to identify the one state, and
only the one state, that will consistently have a significant relationship to the
parties and contracts at issue in the mass contract case.
An exception to the "primary place of business of the common contracting
party" rule exists when the law chosen under that rule "is in material conflict
with the regulatory objectives of the state law in the place of performance or
where the other contracting parties habitually reside." 9 For instance, the state
of performance may have a law that specifically regulates performance under the
type of contract at issue. If the law of the performance state imposes greater or
lesser obligations than the law chosen under the ALI's general rule, then the laws
are in conflict, and the exception to the rule should apply.96 If the exception
applies, the court should apply the law of the performance state (or the law of
the state where the other contracting parties habitually reside, if that is the law
in conflict with the law chosen under the general rule) "to the contracts
legitimately within [its] scope., 97
Finally, like the ALI's approach to mass tort cases, the mass contract case
guidelines provide that the court may divide the actions into subgroups if the
application of a single state's laws to all of the claims asserted "would be
inappropriate." 98 Similarly, the court may remand claims or parties back to the
state courts if it determines that they should not be governed by the law chosen
under the ALI's mass contract choice-of-law framework." Little guidance is
provided by the ALl for determining when such actions are appropriate; hence,
these provisions allow the -court to exercise its discretion in the hope that the
courts will resolve the complex situations that do not fit well in the ALl
framework in ways that are consistent with the overall goals of the Project.
93. Id. § 6.03, cmt. a, at 461.
94. Id.
95. Id. § 6.03(c).
96. Id. § 6.03, cmt. b, at 466.
97. Id. § 6.03(c).




IV. APPLICATION OF THE ALl PROJECT TO COMPREHENSIVE INSURANCE
COVERAGE ACTIONS
With respect to many complex cases, the Project undoubtedly would bring
some semblance of efficiency, predictability, and rationality to an area of law
that often exhibits none of these features. The Project's overriding goals of
efficiency and uniformity appear to provide considerable support for the rejection
of a mechanical law-of-the-site approach in multistate comprehensive environ-
mental coverage actions. Beyond this contribution, however, the Project may
provide little or no consistent relief to the choice-of-law dilemma in comprehen-
sive insurance coverage actions.
For instance, insurance policies differ from many of the contracts that would
be in dispute under the ALI's mass contract guidelines because the key terms are
not typically subject to negotiation, thus further diminishing a state's interest as
the fortuitous "place of contracting." Similarly, the third-party liability insurance
contracts involved in comprehensive environmental insurance coverage cases
arguably implicate tort interests as much as contract interests. Hence, while the
Project may be capable of resolving the choice-of-law problem in either mass tort
or mass contract cases, it is not at all clear that it would tackle cases that involve
both tort and contract interests.
To illustrate the potential applicability of the Project, we will attempt to
apply the project's rules to the typical comprehensive insurance coverage case
described above. Since insurance disputes are normally considered to be
contractual disputes, we will first consider choice of law in a comprehensive
insurance coverage case under the Proposed Final Draft's rules for comprehen-
sive contract cases. Next, because insurance coverage cases of this type also
implicate tort interests, we will consider the choice-of-law problem in compre-
hensive insurance coverage cases by applying the Proposed Final Draft's rules
for mass tort cases.
A. Choice of Law hi Mass hisurance Coverage Cases Unider the ALI's Mass
Contract Approach
First, under the ALI's mass contract approach, the initial question is whether
the parties inserted a choice-of-law provision in the insurance contract, since,
unless an exception applies, Section 6.02 of the Proposed Final Draft honors a
choice-of-law provision included by the parties. Where, however, the insurers
did not include a choice-of-law provision in the standard CGL policy, Section
6.02 will be inapplicable."
100. But see .nqpra note 6 (discussing "Service of Suit" clause contained in certain policies,
especially policies issued by London Market insurers). The Service of Suit clause purports to allow
the policyholder to choose the fotrun for coverage litigation, and, according to most policyholders.
the law to be applied.
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Assuming that no choice-of-law provision exists in the insurance contract,
the Proposed Final Draft requires the court to determine first which states have
a policy that would be furthered by the application of their law, based on
analysis of the following: "(1) the place or places of contracting; (2) the place
or places of performance; (3) the location of the subject matter of the contract;
and (4) the primary places of business or habitual residences of the plaintiffs and
defendants."'"' In comprehensive coverage cases, where numerous insurers
have been named as defendants, the places of contracting and performance,
assuming these can be determined,0 2 often are scattered throughout the
country. Also, the location of the subject matter-arguably the waste sites in a
comprehensive environmental insurance coverage case-will similarly be found
in multiple states. Thus, when faced with a multistate contracts case, the first
three factors will often point to several different states.
Similarly, despite its attempt to narrow the field of potentially interested
states, the fourth factor-"primary places of business .. .of the plaintiffs and
defendants"-will still include several states because of the numerous diverse
parties typically involved in a comprehensive environmental insurance coverage
action.
Therefore, the Proposed Final Draft's four-factor analysis often will fail to
narrow the list of states interested in applying their own law to the comprehen-
sive insurance coverage case. Faced with a choice among several competing
states' laws, the ALl selects the law of the state in which the common
contracting party has its primary place of business. An exception to this rule
applies when the law chosen materially conflicts with the objectives of the state
law of either the place of performance or the place where the other parties
habitually reside.0 ) Having entered into numerous insurance contracts with
various insurance companies from whom it now seeks insurance coverage, the
101. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 55. § 6.03(b)(I)-(4).
102. The Proposed Final Draft acknowledges that the places of contracting and performance
could be ambiguous depending on the circumstances. For instance, it is not clear whether the "place
of contracting" refers "to the place of negotiation or the place of execution, and questions of how to
apply the term when a contract is entered into by way of mail or telephone raise further issues." Id.
§ 6.03, cmt. a. at 462. Nevertheless, the ALl declines to propose a resolution of those potential
ambiguities, instead leaving the resolution of this problem to the courts. Id. The courts historically
have not had much success with these issues, particularly as they would be applied to comprehensive
environmental coverage actions. For example, in Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins., 952 F.2d
756, 758-60 (3d Cir. 1991). and National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 743 F. Supp.
318, 325 (D.N.J. 1990). the courts determined that policies are "made" where they are "counter-
signed" by the insurer. In a comprehensive action involving policies issued by defendants from
numerous different states, the "place of contracting" factor could require application of dozens of
states' laws to the same action, thus defeating one of the main goals of the ALl proposals. See also
Johnson Matthey Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co.. 593 A.2d 367. 372 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991) (noting difficulty of identifying place of contracting and lack of real significance of such
a contact to the disputed issues in an environmental coverage action).
103. Proposed Final Draft. supro note 55. § 6.03(c). The public policy factors discussed supra
at notes 32-54 likely would come into play at this point.
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"common contracting party" in comprehensive insurance coverage cases will
usually be the policyholder corporation. The policyholder may not have a single
"primary place of business" under the ALI's definition, however, particularly if
it is liable for sites scattered across numerous states, and its liability derives from
divisions or subsidiary activity headquartered in multiple jurisdictions.
Moreover, the "accident of corporate procedure or convenience " 'u° that is often
the basis of a party's headquarters or state of incorporation will often give rise
to an insignificant state interest compared to other states in which, for example,
the sites are located or the conduct causing the underlying contamination
occurred. Therefore, the Proposed Final Draft's main rule for resolving choice
of law in mass contract cases will often fail to select a single state's law for use
in comprehensive insurance coverage cases.
B. Choice of Law in Mass Insurance Coverage Cases Under the ALi's Mass
Tort Approach
As noted above, the Project's proposed choice-of-law rules regarding mass
tort cases may be relevant to comprehensive environmental coverage actions
because of the important state interest in the remediation of the underlying sites
giving rise to the insurance dispute. It appears that the ALI's proposed approach
to mass tort cases also does not ensure that the choice-of-law issues in
comprehensive insurance coverage actions will be determined consistently,
predictably, and efficiently.
Like the ALI's proposal for mass contract cases, the rules governing mass
tort cases first require the identification of states that have a policy that would
be furthered by the application of their law. This identification is based on three
factors: "(1) the place or places of injury; (2) the place or places of the conduct
causing the injury; and (3) the primary places of business or habitual residences
of the plaintiffs and defendants." t10 Assuming that the "injury" is the environ-
mental damage that led to the underlying liability, the places of injury in
comprehensive insurance coverage cases will be, at a minimum, all of the states
that contain an environmental site. Similarly, the places of the conduct causing
that injury will include at least all of the states with sites, and also the states in
which the conduct leading to the injury occurred. For example, a landfill located
in Louisiana that is the subject of cleanup activity may have received waste from
the policyholder's plants located in Mississippi and Alabama, because of
decisions made at the division headquarters in Texas. Under these circumstanc-
es, it may be unclear whether the conduct causing the injury occurred in Texas,
Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, or in each of these states. Finally, under the
mass contract case rules, the primary places of business and habitual residences
of the plaintiffs and defendants will be spread throughout numerous states and
104. Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1498. 1502 (1st Cir. 1983).
105. Proposed Final Draft, supra note 55. § 6.01(b)(1)-(3).
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may not give rise to compelling state interests. Therefore, the Proposed Final
Draft's three factors produce a long list of states with an interest in the
application of their law to the insurance coverage litigation.
The Proposed Final Draft's rules for choosing among these different states
will often be insufficient to determine choice of law in comprehensive insurance
coverage cases. For instance, the first rule proposes that "[i]f the place of injury
and the place of the conduct causing the injury are in the same state, that state's
law governs.'"06 In a comprehensive coverage action, however, the places of
injury and the conduct causing those injuries may include at least every state that
has an environmental site within it, and possibly the states where the waste was
generated or relevant decisions were made. Accordingly, it is unlikely that this
first rule will result in a predictable and efficient choice of law for the entire
dispute.
Next, the ALl proposes that if all of the plaintiffs and at least one defendant
habitually reside or have their primary places of business in the same state, then
the laws of that state should govern the plaintiffs' claims against that defen-
dant.0 °7 Once again, the primary places of business of a policyholder corpora-
tion with numerous environmental sites spread across several states should not
be limited to a single state. Consequently, this rule also is either insufficient for
the selection of a single state's law or it is a proposal for the application of. the
law of the site-a proposal that would be inconsistent with the ALI's overall
goals of uniformity and efficiency.
Third, the ALl proposes that if "all of the plaintiffs habitually reside or have
their primary places of business in the same state, and that state also is the place
of injury, then that state's law governs."' °8 If, however, the primary places of
business of the plaintiff and the places of injury include all of the states that
contain an environmental site, then this rule fails to select a single state's law to
govern the case. Like the previous rules, any attempt at making this rule
relevant would likely require an acceptance of the law-of-the-site approach and
its attendant inefficiencies.
Finally, the Proposed Final Draft's residual rule for mass tort cases proposes
that the court choose the law of the state where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; if the conduct occurred in more than one state, the law of the state
with the "most significant relationship to the occurrence" should be chosen.' °9
Since comprehensive insurance coverage cases involve conduct occurring in more
than one state, the court must decide which state has the "most significant
relationship to the occurrence," which, according to the ALl, requires the court
to determine "which conduct is most implicated in the events giving rise to the
106. Id. § 6.01(c)(1).
107. Id. § 6.01(c)(2). Note that states whose laws are not in material conflict are considered to
be the same state for purposes of this section of the proposal. Id.
108. Id. § 6.01(c)(3).
109. Id. § 6.01(c)(4).
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litigation in order to designate the governing law."" 0 Assuming, however, that
no single state stands out as the one with the "most significant relationship"
because the "occurrence[s]" and "the events giving rise to the litigation" are
located in numerous states, then a court faced with a comprehensive insurance
coverage case has two options: (1) ignore the Project as insufficient; (2)
arbitrarily select the law of the state that allegedly has the "most significant
relationship" despite the evidence that no single state has an appreciably greater
interest than any other state; or (3) use the provision that essentially gives the
court the discretion to apply whatever law it feels is "necessary to avoid unfair
surprise or arbitrary results.""'. Regardless of the option chosen, the Proposed
Final Draft's rules for mass tort cases typically will not provide a solution that
can predictably and efficiently be applied to comprehensive insurance coverage
cases.
V. THE FORUM'S INTEREST AND THE INSURERS' FAILURE TO INCLUDE A
CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISION
In virtually every respect, insurance is a creature of state law. Insurers are
regulated by the states concerning solvency issues, rate-making issues, and policy
language issues, and insurance contracts are construed pursuant to state law.
Accordingly, existing choice-of-law approaches, including the ALI's proposal,
have focused on establishing a mechanism for prioritizing individual state
interests. In the context of comprehensive environmental insurance coverage
actions, however, the insurance policies at issue typically are purchased to cover
a national risk, not one that affects only a single state or handful of states. The
contractual disputes focus on underlying cleanup issues scattered across
numerous state lines that many states consider among their top priorities. Thus,
among the most compelling of the affected states' interests is a shared concern
for environmental cleanup issues, including the efficient resolution of disputes
as to ultimate financial responsibility.
Given the number of parties and underlying sites such a complex case may
involve, the adjudication of such an action and the furtherance of these shared
interests can impose a significant burden on the forum state. This burden is a
result of many factors, including the fact that the legal rules applicable to the
disputes between policyholders and their insurers-the resolution of interpretive
issues-is so uncertain. This uncertainty is compounded and perpetuated by the
current lack of predictability concerning the choice-of-law issue. Moreover, this
uncertainty exists because of the failure of the insurers to include in the standard
110. Id. § 6.01, cmt. a, at 406.
111. Id. § 6.01(d) ("When necessary to avoid unfair surprise or arbitrary results, the transferee
court may choose the applicable law on the basis of additional factors that reflect the regulatory
policies and legitimate interests of a particular state not otherwise identified under subsection (b), or
it may depart from the order of preferences for selecting the governing law prescribed by subsection(c).").
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CGL policy any choice-of-law provision. This omission creates an ambiguity
that has contributed significantly to the current plethora of environmental
insurance coverage actions.
112
The choice-of-law approaches to date have not given adequate weight to the
ambiguity created by the insurers' failure to include a choice-of-law provision,
and the resulting burden on forum states when policyholder plaintiffs must
initiate coverage litigation. As demonstrated above, the individual interests of
the competing states are difficult, if not impossible, to prioritize fairly and
adequately. No matter what the ultimate choice-of-law approach is, all courts
surely would recognize interested states' common interest in the efficient
resolution of comprehensive environmental insurance coverage actions. In view
of the foregoing, it is appropriate that in those cases in which the policyholder
has selected the forum, and the forum has a significant interest in the outcome
of the litigation, the forum state's interest should be given predominant weight,
and its law should be applied.'
13
In view of its failure to include a choice-of-law provision in a standardized
contract that purportedly was designed to promote efficiency, predictability, and
certainty, the insurance industry has no legitimate complaint that this approach
would unfairly penalize them."4 Moreover, there are compelling reasons to
adopt such an approach. For example, pursuant to the tests described above, in
many cases the state interests relating to the contracts and the underlying sites
appear to nullify each other, providing little or no guidance concerning choice
of law. If individual interests cancel each other, it is appropriate that the interest
of the judicial system as a whole come to the fore.
Insurers may also argue that such an approach would promote forum
shopping that would subject them to the law of a jurisdiction with no significant
relationship to the dispute. There are many levels of protection against such a
concern, however. First, the basic requirement that the forum have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant ensures that an insurer will not be subject to the
112. Indeed, the failure of insurers to include a choice-of-law provision in the standard COL
policy may be considered a "latent ambiguity," which, according to the fundamental rule of contra
proferentim, must be resolved in favor of the policyholder position. A "latent ambiguity" arises not
upon the face of the policy based on the words selected, but "emerges in attempting to apply those
words in the manner directed" in the policy. Ohio Casualty Group of Ins. Cos. v. Gray, 746 7.2d
381, 383 (7th Cir. 1984).
113. This approach seemingly has been adopted by some courts. See Champion Int'l Cori. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. No. 90-2-09616-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 1990) (environmental
coverage action involving sites in multiple states); In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases Phase Ill and
V-A, Jud. Counc. Coord. Proc. No. 1072, Statement of Reasons for Decision. slip op. (Cal. Super.
Ct. Jan. 24, 1990), aff d, Armstrong World Ind., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 20 Cal. App. 4th
296 (Ist Dist. 1993), rev. granted. 1994 Cal. Lexis 295 (Cal. Jan. 27, 1994) (toxic tort coverage
action).
114. For this reason, the emphasis on the forum state's interest is less appropriate in those




law of a forum with which it does not have some connection. Second, there are
constitutional limits addressing the circumstances under which a forum can apply
its own law; these ensure that any court applying forum law has a significant
interest in the dispute.' Finally, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is
available to discourage forum shopping and to ensure that an action without a
sufficient nexus to the forum state is dismissed.
Application of a single state's law to comprehensive environmental insurance
coverage cases typically will further the virtues of efficiency, certainty, and
predictability that standard-form contracts-such as the COL policy-are
intended to promote. State law is appropriately selected pursuant to the
prevailing choice-of-law rules of the forum state, and in many cases the ALI's
proposal may provide additional guidance. Nevertheless, comprehensive
environmental insurance coverage actions are particularly suited to a choice-of-
law analysis that emphasizes the interest of judicial efficiency and the conse-
quences of the ambiguity created by the insurers' failure to include a choice-of-
law provision in the standard CGL policy.
115. See, e.g.. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts. 472 U.S. 797. 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985). In
Phillips Petroleum, the Supreme Court refused to allow Kansas, as the forum state, to apply its own
law to a nationwide class action suit involving over 7,000 individual gas leases. Only a few of the
leases were actually in the state of Kansas. The court held that a forum may not constitutionally
apply its own law unless it has significant contacts with the dispute. Id. at 821-22, 105 S. Ct. at
2979. For cases addressing the constitutionality of a forum state's application of its own law in the
insurance context, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13, 101 S. Ct. 633, 639-40
(1981) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office. 377 U.S. 179, 84 S. Ct. 1197 (1964);
Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 75 S. Ct. 166 (1954); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 38 S. Ct. 337 (1918).
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